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1569 
NEGOTIATING GENDER AND (FREE AND 
EQUAL) CITIZENSHIP:  THE PLACE OF 
ASSOCIATIONS 
Linda C. McClain* 
It is a great honor to be part of this symposium devoted to 
considering the import of the work of John Rawls for law.  I consider 
myself a liberal feminist, and my understanding of liberalism owes 
much to Rawls’s inspiring work.  I am also honored to have been on a 
panel on “Equal Citizenship:  Gender” with Susan Moller Okin, from 
whose pathbreaking work on justice, gender, and families I have 
learned much.1  Her work was an important opening salvo in what 
remains, as she puts it, an “unfinished debate” between Rawls and 
feminists about justice and gender, and it prompted Rawls to make 
more explicit both the place of families in a well-ordered society, as 
well as the place of justice within families.2 
One focus of my own participation in this debate is to work out a 
liberal feminist account of the place of families in what I call a 
formative project of fostering the capacities for democratic and 
personal self-government.3  In a previous symposium in this series of 
conferences on constitutional theory, The Constitution and the Good 
Society, I addressed the question of the domain of sex equality, 
arguing that sex equality is a component of civic virtue and a public 
 
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law.  This Article grew out of my 
presentation for the “Equal Citizenship: Gender” panel at the Conference on Rawls 
and the Law, held at Fordham University School of Law, November 7-8, 2003.  I 
thank my co-panelists, Tracy Higgins, Susan Moller Okin, and Marion Smiley, as well 
as conference participants, for helpful discussion of the issues raised in this Article.  
Thanks also to Nora Demleitner, Jim Fleming, and Gila Stopler for valuable 
comments.  Thanks to my research assistant Tali Harel and to law librarian Cindie 
Leigh for help with sources.  A research grant from Hofstra University supported this 
Article. 
 1. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989). 
 2. Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1537 (2004).  Rawls addresses Okin’s criticisms of his treatment of families in 
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 162-68 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001), and in 
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765 (1997) 
[hereinafter Rawls, Public Reason].  Tragically, Professor Okin died just as I was 
finishing this Article.  Regrettably, this debate, to which she contributed so much, will 
remain doubly unfinished.  The insightful work she did during her life, however, will 
continue to inform it. 
 3. I explain this approach in a book, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, 
Equality, and Responsibility (under contract with Harvard University Press). 
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value relevant to the regulation of families.4  In the present Article, I 
will focus on the place of associations both within political liberalism 
and in the feminist liberalism I espouse.  I will use the term 
“associations” to refer to institutions of civil society other than 
families:  religious institutions, cultural institutions, and the array of 
voluntary nongovernmental organizations that are found in society.  
Just as feminists question whether Rawls’s A Theory of Justice 
adequately attended to justice within families, thus missing the 
problem of sex inequality, so  they also worry that his treatment of 
associations and, in particular, religious and cultural institutions, in 
Political Liberalism may hinder women’s equal citizenship.  Here, too, 
Okin’s critique of Rawls’s political liberalism is instructive.5 
This Article begins by recapitulating how Rawls presents the place 
of associations.  I focus on his view that associations underwrite a 
stable political order and foster the basic good of self-respect, even as 
the principles of justice shape the domain of associational life.  
Political liberalism distinguishes between the domain of the political 
and the domain of civil society, yet it posits a relationship of mutual 
support, or of reciprocally constituting domains.  What implications 
does this distinction, as well as this relationship of support, have for 
the issue of gender and free and equal citizenship?  Does Rawls’s 
attention to this issue offer a satisfactory response to feminist 
concerns?  In taking up criticisms of Rawls’s response by Okin, as well 
as by liberal feminist Martha Nussbaum,6 I offer a reading of Rawls 
that is more optimistic as to grounding support for the freedom and 
equality of women within political liberalism and to drawing on 
political liberalism in a liberal feminist account of the place of 
associations. 
The second aim of this Article is to bring these liberal, and liberal 
feminist, ideas about associations into dialogue with a body of 
significant, recent feminist work on the relationship between cultural 
and religious traditions and associations and women’s freedom and 
equality.  Some of this work directly responds to Okin’s provocative 
essay, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?,7 which argued that liberal 
theorists attracted to group rights for religious and cultural minorities 
within liberal societies seemed to overlook the tension between 
affirming such rights and feminism’s goals of ending the subordination 
and unequal status of women.  Other work emerges out of the study 
of efforts by groups of women around the world to challenge 
 
 4. See Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: 
Families, Schools, and Sex Equality, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1617 (2001). 
 5. See Susan Moller Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 Ethics 23 
(1994). 
 6. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The 
Capabilities Approach 270-83 (2000) (discussing Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2). 
 7. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 9 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999). 
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dominant interpretations of religion and culture with alternative 
interpretations that better support women’s freedom and equality. 
This feminist work contends not only that Okin, but also many 
other liberals, liberal feminists, and human rights advocates, too 
starkly frame the choice for women as rights or religion, or rights 
versus culture and community.8  This places equal citizenship and 
associational membership at odds.  Instead, these feminists counter 
with a model that would insist on rights and religion and culture, 
reconciling women’s demands for equality and liberty with their 
demands for meaningful self-government within religious and cultural 
associations.  Such a model raises difficult questions about 
governmental regulation of associations and about how a society best 
addresses the tension between associational self-government and the 
personal self-government of individuals within associations.9  In this 
Article, I identify a dialogue between this feminist approach and a 
liberal feminism informed by political liberalism as a fruitful next step 
in considering the place of associations in fostering free and equal 
citizenship and addressing these important questions about their 
proper regulation. 
I.  THE PLACE OF FAMILIES AND ASSOCIATIONS IN POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 
A.  Growing Up Under Just Social and Political Institutions 
Rawls’s political liberalism posits that if we as members of society 
“grow up under a framework of reasonable and just political and 
social institutions, we shall affirm those institutions when we in our 
turn come of age, and they will endure over time.”10  He refers to this 
as a process of “moral learning,” whereby “citizens develop a sense of 
justice as they grow up and take part in their just social world.”11  This 
process of moral learning helps to ensure what he calls “[s]tability for 
the right reasons”—that is, stability is not merely a modus vivendi, 
but, over time, “citizens acquire a sense of justice that inclines them 
not only to accept but to act upon the principles of justice.”12  It was 
precisely Rawls’s reliance upon the role of civil society in the process 
 
 8. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 Yale L.J. 1399 (2003); Gila 
Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community, 
and Women’s Equality (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also 
discussion infra Part II. 
 9. Nussbaum, for example, who identifies her approach as both universalist and a 
form of political liberalism, would address this tension by making the promotion of 
human capabilities a compelling state interest and evaluating families and associations 
based on how well they do in developing the human capabilities of their members. See 
Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 275-76. 
 10. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 7 (1999). 
 11. Id. at 44. 
 12. Id. at 45. 
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of moral learning that led my co-panelist Susan Moller Okin to ask 
how one vital component of civil society—the family—could serve as 
a school for citizenship if principles of justice had no place within it 
and if its actual practices were unjust.13 
One much-discussed feature of Rawls’s political liberalism is his 
premise that it is possible to have a stable political order that rests 
upon a shared political conception of justice, rather than on a shared, 
or unitary, comprehensive doctrine, such as a shared religion.  Rawls 
argued that, given the “fact of reasonable pluralism, constitutional 
democracy must have political and social institutions that effectively 
lead its citizens to acquire the appropriate sense of justice as they 
grow up and take part in society.”14  Political liberalism maintains that 
a reasonable political conception of justice can be supported by an 
“overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”15  As 
Rawls envisions this supporting role played by comprehensive 
doctrines, many of which arise out of associations: 
Comprehensive doctrines of all kinds—religious, philosophical, and 
moral—belong to what we may call the “background culture” of 
civil society.  This is the culture of the social, not of the political.  It 
is the culture of daily life, of its many associations:  churches and 
universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs and teams, to 
mention a few.  In a democratic society there is a tradition of 
democratic thought, the content of which is at least familiar and 
intelligible to the educated common sense of citizens generally.  
Society’s main institutions, and their accepted form of 
interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and 
principles.16 
Thus, the “background culture” of civil society undergirds a shared 
political conception of justice.  Moreover, it facilitates persons 
developing into free and equal citizens.  In Political Liberalism, Rawls 
posits that the “background institutions of civil society” provide 
persons with “those basic freedoms and opportunities . . . that enable 
us to become free and equal citizens in the first place.”17  He speaks of 
the “prior and fundamental role” of society’s basic institutions “in 
establishing a social world within which alone we can develop with 
care, nurture, and education, and no little good fortune, into free and 
equal citizens.”18 
Whether or not Rawls’s vision of a “freestanding political 
conception”19 of justice, supported by and yet separate and apart from 
 
 13. See Okin, supra note 1. 
 14. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 10, at 15. 
 15. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 44 (1996). 
 16. Id. at 14. 
 17. Id. at 41. 
 18. Id. at 43. 
 19. Id. at xlvii. 
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comprehensive doctrines, offers a realistic model has been a subject of 
considerable discussion.  Even many liberals reject the quest for a 
“political” liberalism—that is, one that maintains that it is possible to 
have a stable political order without a shared vision of the good.  That 
is not a debate I wish to take up or add to here.  Instead, my focus is 
on the tensions inherent in the idea of the “background” role that civil 
society plays in supporting the political order and fostering free and 
equal citizenship. 
On the one hand, Rawls does not insist upon “congruence” between 
the values and virtues of the political order and those of civil society.  
Indeed, he observes that they are not identical and envisions a 
“division of labor” among the political and other domains so that each 
has a conception of justice and set of principles and values appropriate 
to it.20  On the other hand, political liberalism also posits some 
continuity—or congruence—between the realm of civil society and 
the political realm, which allows the former to be a “fund of implicitly 
shared ideas and principles”21 that make political stability possible.  
Thus, Rawls writes:  “[A] freestanding political conception [of justice] 
does not . . . say that political values are separate from, or 
discontinuous with, other values.”22  Rather, political liberalism aims 
to specify the “political domain and its conception of justice in such a 
way” that overlapping consensus is possible, and “citizens 
themselves . . . view the political conception as derived from, or 
congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, their other values.”23  In 
other words, there is a “liberal expectancy” of some congruence.24  
Thus, there may be some affinity between Rawls’s idea of the place of 
associations in underwriting constitutional democracy and the claims 
of proponents of civil society that the institutions of civil society are 
“seedbeds of civic virtue.”25 
Political liberalism can harbor such a “liberal expectancy” precisely 
because it does not leave the shape of civil society entirely to chance.  
Rather, political liberalism requires that a political conception of 
justice should shape the “social world,” or just social world, including 
the “background culture” of civil society, so that it will foster free and 
equal citizenship and support for a political conception of justice.  
Thus, Rawls urges readers of Political Liberalism to think of the 
principles of justice as “designed to form the social world in which our 
 
 20. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 789-90. 
 21. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at 14. 
 22. Id. at 10. 
 23. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
 24. On “congruence” and the idea that Rawls’s work has this “liberal 
expectancy,” see the helpful discussion in Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and 
Morals 50-58 (1998). 
 25. For discussion, see McClain, supra note 4; Linda C. McClain & James E. 
Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 301, 303 
& passim (2000). 
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character and our conception of ourselves as persons, as well as our 
comprehensive views and their conceptions of the good, are first 
acquired, and in which our moral powers must be realized, if they are 
to be realized at all.”26 
In a sense, the political domain and the domain of the social world 
are mutually constituting, but the principles of justice, at the outset, 
place constraints on the form the social world may assume.  Again, 
there is a tension between affirming separate domains and insisting 
upon political liberalism’s need to shape the associational domain.  
Thus, on the one hand, Rawls argues that associations, such as 
churches and universities, require principles “plainly more suitable” 
for their own shared aims and purposes than the principles of justice.  
However, he states:  “[B]ecause churches and universities are 
associations within the basic structure, they must adjust to the 
requirements that this structure imposes in order to establish 
background justice.”27  For example, these associations “may be 
restricted . . . by what is necessary to maintain the basic equal liberties 
(including liberty of conscience) and fair equality of opportunity.”28  
As Rawls elaborates in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited: 
A domain so-called, or a sphere of life, is not, then, something 
already given apart from political conceptions of justice.  A domain 
is not a kind of space, or place, but rather is simply the result, or 
upshot, of how the principles of political justice are applied, directly 
to the basic structure and indirectly to the associations within it.29 
Rawls’s clarification, in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited and in 
Justice as Fairness:  A Restatement, about the place of justice in 
families and associations arose in response to feminist critique of his 
apparent inattention to this question.  Rawls offers the example of 
how principles of justice should shape one basic social institution, the 
family, but also suggests that a similar analysis would apply to 
associations and other parts of the “nonpolitical domain” included in 
the basic structure.  His response, however, leaves at least some 
sympathetic feminist critics, such as Okin and Nussbaum, dissatisfied.  
Nussbaum, for example, contends that “Rawls’s approach seems to 
me to stop somewhat short of what justice requires.”30  What are the 
reasons for this dissatisfaction?  Is it justified?  I share some of their 
concerns, but my own reading is more sanguine than theirs in that the 
remarks Rawls offers may support a robust embrace of the freedom 
 
 26. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at 41.  Thus, the “just background 
of that social world is given by the content of the political conception so that by public 
reason all citizens can understand its role and share its political values in the same 
way.” Id. at 43. 
 27. Id. at 261. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 791. 
 30. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 274. 
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and equality of women.  The debate between Rawls and feminists 
must, regrettably, remain (as Okin puts it) “unfinished.”  But I take a 
more optimistic view of the direction in which the debate between 
Rawlsian liberals and feminists might travel. 
Rawls writes in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited that it is a 
“misconception” to think that the principles of justice “do not apply to 
the family and hence those principles do not secure equal justice for 
women and their children.”31  He identifies as one possible source of 
this misconception the ideal that “[t]he principles of political justice 
are to apply directly to [the basic structure of society], but are not to 
apply directly to the internal life of the many associations within it, the 
family among them.”32  But this question of how the principles of 
justice apply to society’s main institutions is “not peculiar” to families, 
Rawls observes, but “arises in regard to all associations, whether they 
be churches or universities, professional or scientific associations, 
business firms or labor unions.”33  For example, he asserts that it is 
“[not] desirable, or consistent with liberty of conscience or freedom of 
association” that the principles of political justice would apply to the 
internal life of churches, just as he assumes that “[w]e wouldn’t want 
political principles of justice—including principles of distributive 
justice—to apply directly to the internal life of the family.”34 
Political liberalism does not insist upon complete congruence 
between principles of political justice and the “internal life” of 
associations.  At the same time, the principles of justice “protect the 
rights and liberties” of persons even when they are members of 
associations, and thus place certain constraints on associational self-
government.  Thus, as applied to the family, “political principles do 
not apply directly to its internal life, but they do impose essential 
constraints on the family as an institution and so guarantee the basic 
rights and liberties, and the freedom and opportunities, of all its 
members.”35  Rawls’s justification for this distinction rests on political 
liberalism’s commitment to toleration of reasonable comprehensive 
views and for persons’ freedom to exercise personal self-government. 
In her contribution to this symposium, Okin contends that this 
answer about the place of justice within the family and its distinction 
between the direct and indirect application of the principles of justice 
is unsatisfying to feminists such as herself, to whom it is not at all 
evident that we would not want families to be regulated internally by 
principles of distributive justice.36  As her other work indicates, Okin 
would similarly ask the question “Why not?,” with respect to religious 
 
 31. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 788. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 789. 
 34. Id. at 789-90. 
 35. Id. at 789. 
 36. Okin, supra note 2, at 1550-51. 
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and cultural associations.37  She suggests that Rawls’s characterization 
of “all the main historical religions” (with the exception of certain 
kinds of fundamentalism) as “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” is 
quite problematic in view of the sexism that is “rife” in the basic texts 
of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.38  She also contends that political 
liberalism’s commitment to toleration leads it to tolerate forms of 
discrimination against women that would not be tolerated if they were 
based on race or ethnicity.39 
Are Okin’s concerns warranted?  I agree with her that there is need 
for further feminist engagement with political liberalism on such 
issues as the reach of the principles of justice into social institutions.  
Feminist criticism, like that of Okin’s, about justice, gender, and the 
family has helped to clarify important points about the place of 
families.  Less adequately addressed in feminist criticism are the 
implications of Rawls’s discussion in The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited for feminist reflection on the place of associations.  What 
potential does political liberalism harbor for an account of 
associations that attends to the ways not only in which they may help 
but also hinder persons negotiating gender and citizenship? 
First, it is striking that in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 
Rawls refers to a “gender system” and observes that “surely that 
system is subject to critique by the principles of justice.”40  A basic aim 
of political liberalism is to derive political principles of justice that 
specify a “single social system,” the “basic structure” of society; “[i]ts 
basic principles of political justice specify all its main parts and its 
basic rights reach throughout.”41  Feminist criticism of A Theory of 
Justice, it is fair to say, helped Rawls to focus on the problem of sex 
inequality and how certain assumptions about justice within that 
single social system, or the basic structure, were unwarranted.  Thus, 
Rawls recognizes that “gender-structured institutions” may require 
reform.  He writes: 
The crucial question may be what precisely is covered by gender-
structured institutions.  How are their lines drawn?  If we say the 
gender system includes whatever social arrangements adversely 
affect the equal basic liberties and opportunities of women, as well 
as those of their children as future citizens, then surely that system is 
subject to critique by the principles of justice.  The question then 
becomes whether the fulfillment of these principles suffices to 
remedy the gender system’s faults.  The remedy depends in part on 
 
 37. Id.; see also Okin, supra note 5. 
 38. Okin, supra note 2, at 1555-56 (citing Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 
15, at 170). 
 39. Id. at 1557. 
 40. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 793. 
 41. Id. at 791. 
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social theory and human psychology, and much else.  It cannot be 
settled by a conception of justice alone.42 
Rawls describes the family as “a crucial case for seeing whether the 
single system—the basic structure—affords equal justice to both men 
and women.”43  Moreover, he specifies some remedies, permissible 
within political liberalism, to address injustice within families related 
to the gendered division of labor.44  As Okin points out, these 
remedies affirm some of the suggestions his feminist critics have 
proposed as to how to make families more just social institutions.45 
Might further reflection have led Rawls to focus upon whether 
associations foster the “gender system” in ways that warrant remedy?  
What might Rawls have delineated as permissible remedies for 
injustices linked to the “gender system” in other associations, such as 
religious and cultural institutions, that exist within the single social 
system?  In responding to Okin, Rawls refers to Mill’s recognition that 
the family of his day was “a school for male despotism:  it inculcated 
habits of thought and ways of feeling and conduct incompatible with 
democracy.”46  Rawls goes on to observe:  “If so, the principles of 
justice enjoining a reasonable constitutional democratic society can 
plainly be invoked to reform the family.”47  Because Okin squarely 
raised her criticism about injustice within families in terms of the 
impact of such injustice on a crucial assumption within Rawls’s 
theory—that families will be sites of moral learning that will undergird 
the political order—Rawls could clearly see that this problem required 
a remedy.  In addition to unfairness to women, these injustices also 
“tend to undermine children’s capacity to acquire the political virtues 
required of future citizens in a viable democratic society.”48  Had 
Rawls reflected further upon the matter, might he have made a 
parallel move to recognize that certain cultural and religious 
associations—rather than being examples of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines—may teach and perpetuate messages of 
gender hierarchy and male authority at odds with fostering the 
capacities for personal and democratic self-government?  And if this 
would serve to perpetuate an unjust “gender system,” what sort of 
remedies might a Rawlsian liberalism support? 
These tantalizing questions must remain unanswered, at least with 
respect to Rawls’s own work.  I believe, however, that it is possible to 
draw support from Rawls’s idea of a “gender system” in need of 
remedy in order to develop an account of how associations fit into 
 
 42. Id. at 793. 
 43. Id. at 792. 
 44. Id. at 792-93. 
 45. Okin, supra note 2, at 1565. 
 46. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 790. 
 47. Id. at 790-91. 
 48. Id. at 790. 
MCCLAINBP 4/18/2004  2:01 PM 
1578 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
“the basic structure” that “affords equal justice to both men and 
women.”  For example, the idea of a “gender system” might be 
extended to focus on how cultural, religious, and legal enforcement of 
a norm of heterosexuality limits women’s and men’s freedom and 
equality.  If so, then a proper ordering of political values might well 
condemn such measures as the Defense of Marriage Act and the more 
recently proposed “federal marriage amendment.”49  Similarly, 
feminist scholars might fruitfully consider how a proper ordering of 
political values brings into focus the intertwining of the “gender 
system” with ethnic, racial, and economic systems as well (i.e., other 
divisions of labor within society reflecting historical injustice, and also 
adversely affecting equal basic liberties and opportunities). 
Second, the helpful method Rawls suggests in The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited is reflection on how the “ordering of political 
values” should apply to institutions within the basic structure.  Thus, 
he indicates in his discussion of the family as “part of the basic 
structure” that among these values are “the freedom and equality of 
women, the equality of children as future citizens, the freedom of 
religion, and finally, the value of the family in securing the orderly 
production and reproduction of society and of its culture from one 
generation to the next.”50  Rawls then states:  “These values provide 
public reasons for all citizens.”51  I find this statement to be critically 
important because it grounds “the freedom and equality of women” as 
a part of public reason, not merely part of one of many contested 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  As I have written elsewhere, 
feminists working within a political liberal framework may usefully 
employ this commitment to women’s freedom and equality to explain 
why governmental measures to foster such freedom and equality are 
justifiable and consistent with toleration.52  As Okin points out, there 
is also enormous potential in Rawls’s statement in the introduction to 
Political Liberalism that “[t]he same equality of the Declaration of 
Independence which Lincoln invoked to condemn slavery can be 
invoked to condemn the inequality and oppression of women.”53 
 
 49. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).  The proposed federal marriage amendment, 
known as the “marriage bill,” introduced by Representative Marilyn Musgrave, reads: 
“Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.  
Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor any state or federal law, 
shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be 
conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.” H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); see 
also S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 50. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 793. 
 51. Id. at 793-94 (emphasis added). 
 52. See Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion 
of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 
21 (1998). 
 53. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at xxxi.  For discussion, see Okin, 
supra note 2, at 1565. 
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These two statements about women’s freedom and equality, 
together with Rawls’s recognition that the “gender system” may be 
subject to critique by the principles of justice, securely ground the 
place of sex equality within a political conception of a well-ordered 
society.  To be sure, the questions surrounding the place of women 
and men in society—particularly as they relate to proper gender roles 
and identities in the domains of sexuality, family, marriage, and 
work—continue to be matters as to which there is considerable 
disagreement.  In our constitutional order, however, at least since the 
doctrinal shifts in equal protection law commencing in the 1970s, the 
requirements of equal citizenship bar state support of the sort of 
gender hierarchy of male authority/female deference within families 
and other spheres of civil society that made up the system.54  Similarly, 
civil rights laws of the 1960s put limits on both public and private 
forms of discrimination that were part of this “gender system.” 
If the political conception of the place of gender in the social system 
has changed from hierarchy to equality, so that—as I have argued 
elsewhere55—sex equality is a political value as well as a constitutional 
norm, what implications does this have for notions of proper gender 
ordering in the “social world”?  What implications does this have for 
what sort of freedom of association is compatible with this political 
value, or how to order this political value and other important 
political values? 
How political liberalism might answer these questions seems to turn 
on three distinctions.  The first, already discussed, is its insistence that 
 
 54. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding that a statute that 
granted a husband, as “head and master” of property he jointly owned with his wife 
the sole right to dispose of the property without his wife’s consent violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) 
(holding that a statutory scheme providing that husbands, but not wives, may be 
required to pay alimony upon divorce violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause because a gender-neutral classification would serve as well as a 
gender classification (which carried the baggage of gender-role stereotypes) to carry 
out the state’s compensatory and ameliorative purposes); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
U.S. 199 (1977) (holding that a sex-based distinction between widows and widowers, 
in which Social Security Act survivors’ benefits were payable to a female wage 
earner’s widower only if he was receiving at least half of his support from her, while 
they were payable to a male wage earner’s widow regardless of dependency, violated 
due process and equal protection); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (holding that 
a statute—under which girls attained majority, and ceased receiving child support, 
when they became eighteen, but boys did not until they became twenty-one—could 
not survive an equal protection attack); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) 
(holding that statutes presuming, solely for administrative convenience, that spouses 
of male members of the military are dependents for the purpose of obtaining certain 
benefits, but that spouses of female members are not, unless they are dependent for 
over one-half of their support,  violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that statutes providing that, between 
persons equally qualified to administer estates, males must be preferred to females 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
 55. McClain, supra note 4. 
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the principles of justice apply directly to the basic structure, by 
constraining associations from violating citizens’ basic rights and 
liberties and freedom of opportunities, but do not directly apply to the 
“internal life” of associations.  The second is the distinction between 
“reasonable pluralism” and pluralism as such (and “reasonable” and 
“unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines).  The third is the distinction 
between government’s authority to eliminate and remedy involuntary, 
as distinguished from voluntary, gendered divisions of labor.  Okin 
and our co-panelist Tracy Higgins, for example, find Rawls’s use and 
application of all of these distinctions troubling, for they conclude that 
they allow religiously grounded forms of sex inequality.56 
A full discussion of these distinctions, and, particularly, how Rawls 
distinguishes “reasonable” and “unreasonable” comprehensive 
doctrines, is beyond the scope of this Article.  The crucial issue at 
hand is feminist fear that political liberalism’s toleration of 
“reasonable” comprehensive views will extend too far and include 
religious and cultural traditions that justify sex inequality and, because 
of gender role conceptions, limit persons’ development of their 
capacities for personal and democratic self-government. 
In light of political liberalism’s embrace of “the freedom and 
equality of women” as a political value, may a comprehensive doctrine 
that denies such freedom and equality be “reasonable,” or must it be 
deemed “unreasonable”?  Political Liberalism rules out of bounds “a 
conception of the good requiring the repression or degradation of 
certain persons on, say, racial, or ethnic, or perfectionist grounds, for 
example, slavery in ancient Athens, or in the antebellum south.”57  
Okin points out this passage and asks why political liberalism would 
not similarly condemn doctrines requiring the repression or 
degradation of persons on the grounds of sex.58 
This is an important question, and I believe that the answer is that 
political liberalism would condemn such doctrines.  First, given that 
political liberalism recognizes the freedom and equality of women as a 
political value, surely these doctrines would and should be considered 
unreasonable.  Second, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls himself 
indicates that the idea of basic human rights places limits on a 
religion’s ability to “claim as a justification for its subjection of women 
that it is necessary for its survival.”59  Rawls draws on analogies to the 
argument that “a religion cannot claim as a justification that its 
intolerance of other religions is necessary for it to maintain itself.”60  
In both cases, “[b]asic human rights are involved, and these belong to 
 
 56. Okin, supra note 2, at 1552-62; Tracy Higgins, Why Feminists Can’t (or 
Shouldn’t) Be Liberals, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1629 (2004). 
 57. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at 196. 
 58. Okin, supra note 2, at 1557. 
 59. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 10, at 111. 
 60. Id. 
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the common institutions and practices of all liberal and decent 
societies.”61  From this argument, I infer that even though political 
liberalism recognizes that associations may have principles of justice 
distinct from the political conception of justice, the political 
conception may not tolerate certain views of justice generated or 
sustained by associations. 
What is the scope of the idea of the “subjection of women”?  Would 
forms of gender socialization raise concerns similar to those raised by 
repression or degradation?  What if, as some scholars contend, the 
practical effect of education in Christian fundamentalist and Catholic 
schools is to teach female students that “they are by virtue of their 
gender, inferior human beings”?62  One study concludes: 
Fundamentalist schools deliberately and systematically inculcate in 
their students the belief that females are inferior to males, that a 
woman’s only purpose in life is to serve a husband and raise 
children, and that only men should pursue careers outside the home, 
become active in public affairs and leaders of their community, or 
even to assert opinions about matters beyond home life.  To think 
otherwise is sinful:  “sexual equality denies God’s word.”63 
If this research is credible, and such education takes a toll on young 
women’s capacities, can these religious traditions be “reasonable” 
ones? 
Political liberalism’s concern for children’s developing the capacity 
to be fully cooperating members of society would surely lead to some 
constraints on associations’ perpetuating these sorts of messages, 
whether this took the form of educational campaigns by government 
to promote sex equality or curriculum requirements to do so.  Surely, 
political liberalism could not endorse government’s financially 
supporting such messages, for example, through a voucher program.  
For instance, Gila Stopler argues that, just as states may require that a 
religious educational institution’s participation in a voucher program 
is contingent upon its not teaching messages of hatred based on, for 
example, race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion, states should also 
include sex in this list.64  Indeed, she proposes that given the harmful 
impact of certain forms of religious socialization upon girls’ capacity 
for citizenship, schools receiving vouchers should be required to 
include education for equality between the sexes.  In other writing, I 
support this sort of education as a component of public schools’ 
mission.  It seems credible to extend this requirement once private 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Stopler, supra note 8, at 63. 
 63. Id. (quoting James G. Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children’s Rights 39 
(1998)). 
 64. Id. at 67. 
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schools take on public funding and, thus, arguably, advance public 
purposes.65 
A tougher case is posed by religious doctrines that affirm a basic 
equality of women and men before God, but interpret this equality to 
encompass complementary, and different, natures and capacities of 
women and men that warrant different social roles and levels of 
authority.66  Are these “reasonable” or “unreasonable”?  In Part II, I 
suggest that one useful way to explore these questions about the place 
of women’s freedom and equality in “reasonable” comprehensive 
doctrines is through looking at the efforts of feminists working within 
particular cultural and religious traditions to challenge understandings 
of those doctrines that hinder, rather than foster, women’s freedom 
and equality. 
Issues of gender complementarity also implicate Rawls’s distinction 
between the place for voluntary and involuntary gendered divisions of 
labor within the family as well as, I infer, associations.  What is a 
“voluntary” gendered division of labor?  What distinguishes it from an 
“involuntary” one?  There may be more room for feminists to work 
with this distinction than Okin allows.  Rawls argues that political 
liberalism can seek to reduce the involuntary gendered division of 
labor within the basic structure to zero, but that it “may have to allow 
for some traditional gendered division of labor within families—
assume, say, that this division is based on religion—provided it is fully 
voluntary and does not result from or lead to injustice.”67  For 
example, he writes:  “If the gendered division of labor in the family is 
indeed fully voluntary, then there is reason to think that the single 
system realizes fair equality of opportunity for both genders.”68 
Rawls’s example of a “voluntary” division of labor as one “based on 
religion” comes with two important qualifications.  First, Rawls’s 
definition of “voluntary” is more demanding than a simple affirmation 
of one’s religion.  Rather, in a footnote, he explains that the decision 
must be voluntary in the sense of being “reasonable”—that is, “doing 
the rational thing when all the surrounding conditions are also fair,” 
 
 65. McClain, supra note 4, at 1653-64.  On the idea of harnessing religious 
educational institutions to advance public purposes by government’s attaching certain 
anti-discrimination requirements to the receipt of public funds, see Stephen Macedo, 
The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social Capital and Substantive 
Morality, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1573 (2001). 
 66. See Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: 
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 189 (2002).  As Blenkhorn writes, “most Muslims believe that women 
and men are spiritually equal before God, but that women are socially inferior to men 
due to distinct, asymmetrical domestic duties.” Id. at 194.  Arguments about gender 
complementarity within various denominations of Christianity draw on biblical verses 
about the husband’s being the “head” of the household and the wife’s owing 
obedience. 
 67. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 792. 
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or in the case of religious conviction, “affirming one’s religion is 
voluntary when all of the surrounding conditions are reasonable, or 
fair.”69  Although Rawls does not pursue it in the text, this indication 
that the “subjective conditions of voluntariness”70 must be present 
gives, in my view, considerable room to argue about how the gender 
system that shapes the surrounding conditions calls into question 
assumptions about “voluntariness.”  For example, if socialization of 
girls and women into a particular religion’s teachings has the effect of 
impairing their capacity for exercising personal self-government, or 
what some scholars call “autonomy competency,” then this would 
appear to call into question whether a gendered division of labor is 
voluntary.71  By analogy, feminists have done helpful work on the 
constraints on women’s “choice” in the context of their respective 
investments in work and family.72  This work illuminates how unjust 
social conditions that are not supportive of the important task (and 
political value) of reproduction and social reproduction make it more 
rational for women to opt out of paid employment.73 
A second qualification Rawls offers is that the gendered division of 
labor does not “lead to injustice.”74  This qualification offers room for 
challenges to unjust results.  A more systemic argument is also 
available.  In Political Liberalism, Rawls explains that the “role of the 
institutions that belong to the basic structure is to secure just 
background conditions against which the actions of individuals and 
associations take place.”75  However, “[u]nless this structure is 
appropriately regulated and adjusted, an initially just social process 
will eventually cease to be just, however free and fair particular 
transactions may look when viewed by themselves.”76  Addressing this 
tendency requires “special institutions to preserve background 
 
 69. Id. at 792 n.68. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Stopler, supra note 8, at 57 (drawing on the idea of “autonomy competency” 
in Diana T. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (1989)). 
 72. Joan Williams, Unbending Gender (2000). 
 73. To take one recent example involving the gendered division of labor within 
the family, a recent New York Times Magazine had a cover story entitled Q: Why 
Don’t More Women Get to the Top?  A: They Choose Not To.  The premise of the 
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least some of the women profiled seemed to make choices that were less than “fully 
voluntary” in the sense that Rawls uses the term.  For example, two women who were 
mothers tried unsuccessfully within their places of employment to negotiate a work 
schedule that would have allowed them to combine mothering responsibilities and 
their job.  Their proposals were ignored or met with indifference; only then, with 
some considerable regret, did they leave their jobs. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out 
Revolution, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 42. 
 74. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 792. 
 75. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at 266. 
 76. Id. 
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justice.”77  This diagnosis of a tendency toward injustice shifts a focus 
from voluntary and involuntary to a more systemic need for 
regulation.  Although Rawls does not develop such an argument in 
the context of the “single social system’s” tendency toward an unjust 
“gender system,” liberal feminists certainly could pursue this line of 
argument and explore what sorts of special institutions might be 
appropriate and how they might shape the basic structure within 
which associational life occurs. 
B.  The Place of Associations in Fostering Self-Respect of Persons and 
Peoples 
The place of associations in a political liberal order is not confined 
to their role in undergirding a political consensus and fostering 
members’ capacities for democratic self-government.  Rawls also 
speaks of the place of associations and associative ties in helping 
members of society to realize the important good (in Rawls’s 
terminology, the “primary good”) of self-respect.78  This function of 
associations appears to relate particularly to aiding persons’ 
development of their capacity to form, act on, and revise a conception 
of a good life.  As Rawls wrote in A Theory of Justice: 
It normally suffices [to provide a basis of self-respect] that for each 
person there is some association (one or more) to which he belongs 
and within which the activities that are rational for him are publicly 
affirmed by others.  In this way we acquire a sense that what we do 
in everyday life is worthwhile.  Moreover, associative ties strengthen 
the second aspect of self-esteem, since they tend to reduce the 
likelihood of failure and to provide support against the sense of self-
doubt when mishaps occur.  To be sure, men [sic] have varying 
capacities and abilities, and what seems interesting and challenging 
to some will not seem so to others.  Yet in a well-ordered society 
anyway, there are a variety of communities and associations, and the 
members of each have their own ideals appropriately matched to 
their aspirations and talents. . . .  What counts is that the internal life 
of these associations is suitably adjusted to the abilities and wants of 
those belonging to them, and provides a secure basis for the sense of 
worth of their members.79 
Under what conditions will associational life foster self-respect?  
Just as political liberalism views the political domain and the 
“background culture” of civil society as mutually supporting each 
other, so, too, the principles of justice specify that persons should be 
accorded the “social bases of self-respect,” such as “the equal basic 
rights and liberties, the fair value of the political liberties and fair 
 
 77. Id. at 267. 
 78. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 67, at 386-88 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 79. Id. at 387-88. 
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equality of opportunity.”80  In other words, the political conception of 
justice shapes the domain of the “background culture” of civil society 
by ensuring that persons within civil society have these social bases of 
self-respect.  As noted above, in explaining the idea of distinct 
domains, Rawls stresses that “[t]he principles defining the equal basic 
liberties and opportunities of citizens always hold in and through all 
so-called domains.”81  With respect to feminist concern about injustice 
within families, Rawls responds:  “The equal rights of women and the 
basic rights of their children as future citizens are inalienable and 
protect them wherever they are.  Gender distinctions limiting those 
rights and liberties are excluded.”82  Rawls intends this qualification to 
apply to associations as well. 
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls applies the idea of self-respect to 
peoples.  Here, too, he indicates the interplay between the political 
domain and the “background culture” of civil society in fostering self-
respect.  He argues that the self-respect of “liberal peoples” “rests on 
the freedom and integrity of their citizens and the justice and decency 
of their domestic political and social institutions,” as well as on “the 
achievements of their public and civic culture”—all things “rooted in 
their civic society.”83  Indeed, one argument Rawls offers against 
imposing sanctions on “decent nonliberal peoples” is that it will 
“wound” their self-respect.84  He contends that it is “surely . . . a good 
for individuals and associations to be attached to their particular 
culture and to take part in its common public and civic life,” for “in 
this way political society is expressed and fulfilled.”85  Thus, he argues 
for “due respect” by liberal peoples of decent nonliberal peoples, and 
contends that a decent nonliberal society that receives this respect 
“may be more likely, over time, to recognize the advantages of liberal 
institutions and take steps toward becoming more liberal on its 
own.”86 
But what makes a society a “decent” nonliberal one?  Rawls defines 
“decent nonliberal peoples” in a way that insists that all members 
have human rights, including the right to life, to liberty, to property, 
and to formal equality “as expressed by the rules of natural justice.”87  
As I discuss in the next section, Rawls gives particular attention to the 
requirements that the basic human rights of women not be violated 
and that women are represented in the political process. 
It bears mentioning two different, but related, lines of possible 
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feminist criticism of political liberalism’s link between participation in 
associational life and the good of self-respect.  First, feminists might 
argue that this account ignores the fact that associations that do not 
affirm and foster the freedom and equality of women may hinder, 
rather than facilitate, women’s acquiring the good of self-respect.  
Second, feminists might contend that Rawls’s account does not seem 
to recognize the role of associations in affording a space in which 
persons might find the self-respect denied them in other associations 
or in society’s basic institutions.  Further, such associations might 
facilitate the articulation of dissenting views about what justice 
requires and lead to social and, ultimately, legal and political change. 
My view is that political liberalism attempts to address the first 
problem through the idea that the principles of justice shape—and put 
constraints upon—the nonpolitical domain, or the “background 
culture of civil society” in a way that seeks to facilitate persons 
acquiring self-respect.  As to the second line of feminist criticism, 
political liberalism recognizes, even if it does not elaborate upon, this 
important transformative and political aspect of associational life, that 
is, of the “background culture of civil society.”88  As I have explained 
elsewhere, my own liberal feminist view of the place of associations 
recognizes that “civil society contributes to liberal democracy by 
affording oppositional space to ‘enclaves of protected discourse and 
action,’ which allow social actors to seek to correct the injustices of an 
ongoing democracy by bringing about social change.”89  As the next 
part explains, this change may pertain to the norms and practices of 
associations, as well as to laws and the polity. 
II.  RIGHTS VERSUS OR RIGHTS WITHIN RELIGION AND CULTURE?: 
FEMINISTS DEBATE THE PLACE OF ASSOCIATIONS 
Feminist debates in recent years over a perceived tension between 
protection of associational life and securing women’s freedom and 
equality arise in many contexts.  For example, in her book, The Claims 
of Culture, Seyla Benhabib identifies several examples, in the United 
States and in other countries, of potential conflict between “claims to 
cultural difference and universalist human-rights norms”:  the 
assertion (in the United States) by cultural or ethnic minorities of 
cultural defenses to criminal charges; the dilemma of reconciling (e.g., 
in India) generally applicable laws affording women certain rights and 
protections with personal and family laws, based on religion, that 
perpetuate gender hierarchy; and efforts by governments (e.g., in 
France) to restrict the wearing of religious dress in public institutions 
 
 88. See Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 774-75 & nn.28 & 30. 
 89. McClain & Fleming, supra note 25, at 321-22 (using the phrase “enclaves of 
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to promote civil solidarity and governmental neutrality toward 
religion.90  An increasingly visible example is women living under 
Muslim laws seeking to interpret—as well as transform—such laws in 
ways supportive of their greater freedom and equality.91  Benhabib 
posits that so many of the dilemmas regarding the limits of 
multiculturalism implicate the “status of women in distinct cultural 
communities” in part because “women and their bodies are the 
symbolic-cultural site upon which human societies inscript their moral 
order.”92 
In Part I, I argued that participation in associations may foster 
persons’ developing into free and equal citizens, with the capacity for 
personal and democratic self-government, but that the claims of 
associational life may also hinder such self-government.  In recent 
years, this tension has seemed especially acute when constraints on 
women’s citizenship appear to find justification in religious and 
cultural traditions.  And notwithstanding the portrait of associations 
as generating civic virtues, sometimes the values inculcated in 
associations may be in conflict with democratic values.  This raises the 
question about the extent to which the values and virtues of 
associations warrant toleration, in our constitutional order, even if 
they conflict with democratic values and virtues. 
As Benhabib observes, Okin’s “opening salvo” in the debate over 
multiculturalism and women’s rights, Is Multiculturalism Bad for 
Women?, “raised hackles” (even among feminists) in part for its 
provocative way of putting the question.93  Just as Okin worries that 
political liberalism’s toleration of “reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines” allows for religious and cultural practices that discriminate 
against women, her essay contends that a liberal impulse to extend 
“group rights” to religious and cultural minorities may also lead to 
tolerating religiously and culturally sanctioned forms of sex 
inequality.94  She addresses liberal defenders of group rights who 
maintain that special protections may be necessary for cultural 
minorities.  She claims that when a culture “endorses and facilitates 
the control of men over women in various ways,” to accord group 
rights to such a culture is “antifeminist,” because such rights 
“substantially limit the capacities of women and girls of that culture to 
 
 90. Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture 86-100 (2002). 
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live with human dignity equal to that of men and boys, and to live as 
freely chosen lives as they can.”95 
Okin is particularly critical of the role of religious and cultural 
traditions in bringing women’s sexuality and reproductive capabilities 
under men’s control and in rendering women “servile to men’s desires 
and interests.”96  According to Okin, some cultures, namely, Western 
liberal cultures, have moved further from their patriarchal pasts than 
others.  Thus, although “[m]ost cultures are patriarchal, . . . many 
(though not all) of the cultural minorities that claim group rights are 
more patriarchal than the surrounding cultures.”97 
To liberals who stress the need for protecting cultures so that 
members within them have a “rich and secure cultural structure”98 
within which to develop self-respect and the capacity to make choices 
about how to live their lives, Okin responds that pervasive cultural 
practices discriminating against and controlling women threaten the 
capacity of women to question the social roles that a particular culture 
instills and enforces upon them.  In other words, the force of gender 
socialization and discrimination renders impossible, or very difficult, 
the liberal goal of revisability—that is, questioning one’s inherited 
social roles and exiting oppressive associations.  Instead, putting the 
point bluntly, Okin contends: 
In the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in the context of a 
less patriarchal majority culture, no argument can be made on the 
basis of self-respect or freedom that the female members of the 
[former] culture have a clear interest in its preservation.  Indeed, 
they might be much better off if the culture into which they were 
born were either to become extinct (so that its members would 
become integrated into the less sexist surrounding culture) or, 
preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the 
equality of women—at least to the degree to which this is upheld in 
the majority culture.99 
Okin’s essay invites attention to the place of individuals within 
associations and on tensions between personal self-government and 
associational self-government.  Her critique has garnered considerable 
criticism, even among feminist scholars, for its stark framing of the 
issue as “feminism versus multiculturalism” and for its allegedly 
monolithic and static conceptions of religion and culture.100  Some 
feminist scholars view her work as emblematic of a strand of Western 
feminist argument that interprets the condition of immigrant or Third 
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World women as a form of “death by culture,” while failing to 
recognize serious forms of sex inequality closer to home.101  Moreover, 
feminist legal scholar Leti Volpp argues that this “excessive focus” by 
Okin and other Western liberal and liberal feminist scholars upon 
“minority and Third World sex-subordinating cultural practices” has 
other detrimental effects, such as positioning “other” women as 
“perennial victims,” thus denying “their potential to be understood as 
emancipatory subjects,” and diverting attention away from structural 
forces that shape cultural practices.102 
In this Article, I am not attempting to delve fully into all of the 
controversy over Okin’s essay, and I will not take up in detail the 
specific responses Okin has offered to her critics.103  Rather, I would 
like to focus on what this disagreement among feminists may 
illuminate about how to view the place of associations in securing or 
hindering equal citizenship.  I also consider how some of the basic 
features of political liberalism, as discussed above, might usefully 
contribute to thinking about this issue. 
It would be unfortunate if Okin’s blunt statement of the issues 
diverted attention from what I believe is an important underlying 
point:  Religious and cultural traditions often serve as justifications for 
restricting women’s self-determination and for various forms of 
gender-based inequality.104  Moreover, forms of sex discrimination 
rooted in social attitudes and religious and cultural understandings 
can persist notwithstanding formal legal guarantees of rights to liberty 
and equality.105  (As a helpful example of why Western feminists 
should be alert not just to forms of sex inequality abroad but also to 
those at home, the New York Times recently featured a story about 
the persistence of sex-selection abortion in India because of a 
preference for sons over daughters and another story about the 
persistence in the United States over the last sixty years of higher 
divorce rates among couples with only girl children than couples with 
 
 101. See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1181, 
1185-95 (2001).  For an elaboration of how the idea of “death by culture” underlies 
some Western feminist analysis of problems experienced by non-Western women, see 
Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures 84-88 (1997) (discussing the role of “culture” in 
purporting to explain dowry murders in India). 
 102. Volpp, supra note 101, at 1204-05 (also identifying directing attention away 
“from issues affecting women that are separate from what are considered sexist 
cultural practices”).  For a helpful, earlier discussion of feminist debate over 
universalist versus cultural relativist approaches to human rights, see Tracy E. 
Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 Harv. Women’s L.J. 89 
(1996). 
 103. See Susan Moller Okin, Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple Questions, 
No Simple Answers (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 104. See also Benhabib, supra note 90, at 100 (criticizing Okin’s essay in certain 
respects but observing that “[c]ertainly Okin was right in raising these issues”). 
 105. See Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals 
Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12 Colum. 
J. Gender & L. 154 (2003). 
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only boy children.106)  My co-panelist Tracy Higgins’s report on her 
human rights mission to Ghana found that despite the enactment of 
laws affirming formal equality for men and women in the areas of 
property and inheritance laws, social resistance to such equality and 
traditional attitudes about the sexes hinders the enforcement of such 
laws.107  The transition in Afghanistan from a condition of extreme 
repression of women (justified by an appeal to religion) to a new 
constitutional order with formal guarantees of equality may afford 
another example.  How will the constitution’s guarantees of freedom 
from discrimination and of equal rights and duties before the law 
reconcile with the provision that “no law can be contrary to the sacred 
religion of Islam” and that laws protecting the family (especially the 
child and mother) shall not be contrary to “the sacred religion of 
Islam”?108 
Recognizing that some cultural and religious practices and 
teachings appear to justify sex inequality, and thus may hinder rather 
than foster women’s personal self-government, is an important 
component of a feminist analysis of the place of associations.  As 
discussed above, whether the appropriate distinction is between 
reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, or a different 
limiting principle, affirming the freedom and equality of women as a 
political value justifies certain protections of women even when they 
are members of associations (for example, the important liberal right 
to exit oppressive communities).  A further useful step, however, is 
one being urged by a variety of feminist scholars seeking to move 
away from a “rights versus culture” framework to one of “rights 
within culture,” or rights within religious and cultural communities.  
For example, Uma Narayan acknowledges the use of “culture” to 
justify various forms of gender inequality, but goes on to argue that 
there is often considerable internal contestation of the meaning of 
“culture,” including readings more supportive of women’s equality 
and liberty.109  Thus, some feminist scholars argue for a right to remain 
within a cultural or religious community and to affirm sex equality and 
autonomy. 
The model these feminist scholars advance recognizes a positive 
value to being within a community and the constitutive role of 
membership in shaping the self, even as it insists on bringing into that 
sphere limiting principles of equality and freedom.  This feminist work 
 
 106. Compare David Rhode, India Steps Up Effort to Halt Abortions of Female 
Fetuses, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2003, § 1, at 3 with David Leonhardt, It’s a Girl! (Will the 
Economy Suffer?): Couples With Boys Are Divorcing Less, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2003, 
§ 3, at 1. 
 107. Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture, and 
Women’s Inheritance Rights in Ghana, 25 Fordham Int’l L.J. 259, 295-311 (2001). 
 108. See Afg. Const. art. 2, 22, 54 (2003 Draft), available at http://www.constitution-
afg.com/draft_const.htm. 
 109. Narayan, supra note 101, at 3-39. 
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focuses on the place of individuals within civil associations by insisting 
on their rights to be represented when courts or legislatures must 
consider what conception of a particular cultural or religious tradition 
should guide a law or a judicial opinion.110  Such feminists contend 
that, too often, when courts and legislatures confront claims based on 
religion, they view religion as static and unchanging and “defer[] to 
fundamentalist claims to discriminate in the name of religion or 
culture, thwarting the claims of dissenting women and other advocates 
of change.”111  For example, Madhavi Sunder offers examples of such 
political actors interpreting and upholding “personal laws” and 
“customary laws” without listening to the voices of those within 
communities that seek to make such laws more just.112  Similarly, Gila 
Stopler, focusing on Israel, which has personal religious laws, and the 
United States, which is constitutionally committed to the separation of 
church and state and to gender neutrality in its laws, contends: 
In all these cases state power is used in the service of community 
leaders and the patriarchal and hierarchical norms these leaders 
seek to impose for their benefit, at the expense of the basic right to 
equality of the community’s weaker members as well as at the 
expense of their right to participate in the shaping of the community 
in which they live.113 
Sunder argues that current human rights discourse offers women 
and other dissenters too stark a choice:  rights or culture.  Instead, 
women should have the right not just to exit religious communities, 
but also to participate in shaping those communities and to have their 
voices heard in defining those communities’ norms and values.  She 
critiques current legal treatment of religion: 
Premised upon an outmoded conception of religion as homogeneous 
and static, law presumes religious communities have a uniform view 
and refuses to confront actual plurality and contestation within a 
religious community.  But . . . [a]ll over the world, women are 
contesting traditional customary and religious laws and demanding a 
right to participate in the process of making religious or cultural 
meanings.  Seen in this light, current law is procedurally faulty 
because law does not recognize everyone equally within the 
community as having a say in these processes. . . .  Women’s activism 
around the globe also challenges the normative premise of current 
law, which accepts (and expects) imposed identity and despotism 
within religion, so long as one has freedom in the public sphere.  
Departing from this traditional view, women are today making 
normative demands for a right to freedom and equality within 
 
 110. See Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development 
Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 381 (2000). 
 111. Sunder, supra note 8, at 1425. 
 112. Id. at 1425-33. 
 113. Stopler, supra note 8, at 35. 
MCCLAINBP 4/18/2004  2:01 PM 
1592 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
religion, as well as in the public sphere.  But current law ignores 
these claims.114 
Sunder offers as case studies of this “dialogical model,” which 
enables women to claim both rights and religion, the efforts of the 
group Women Living Under Muslim Laws (“WLUML”) and the 
human rights manual, Claiming Our Rights:  A Manual for Women’s 
Human Rights Education in Muslim Societies.115  These groups find 
support for sex equality from a critical engagement with the internal 
norms of such religious and cultural traditions, and not solely from 
public values and norms from “outside” such traditions.  For example, 
although she does not call herself a feminist, the recent Nobel Prize 
winner, Iranian human rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi, characterizes her 
mission as pressing the case that Islam is compatible with human 
rights, including treating women equally with men.116  Sunder 
highlights that WLUML stresses that it is only when women assume 
the right to “define for themselves the parameters of their own 
identity and stop accepting unconditionally and without question what 
is presented to them as the ‘correct’ religion, the ‘correct’ culture, or 
the ‘correct’ national identity that they will be able effectively to 
challenge the corpus of laws imposed on them.”117 
New forms of association play a vital role in this work of fostering 
self-definition and the assertion of individual agency.  This relates to 
the role of associations, discussed in Part I, in fostering self-respect, as 
well as alternative conceptions of justice both within associations and 
in the polity.  For example, WLUML’s creation of a network that 
collects and disseminates information about the actual diversity of 
laws and customs throughout the Muslim world and its sponsorship of 
face-to-face meetings “help to break women’s isolation” and to 
“undermine the claims of fundamentalists that there is just one way of 
being Muslim.”118  These forms of associational life also serve a critical 
educational role in letting women know about other possible ways of 
being and doing.  As one official within WLUML put it, “[we are] 
giving women the tool to be able to say that women’s rights are part of 
your own culture.”119 
It may be apt to think of groups like WLUML as creating 
“counterpublics” or “deliberative enclaves of resistance,” in which 
members of the association are able to work out a sense of identity 
 
 114. Sunder, supra note 8, at 1432-33. 
 115. Id. at 1433-51 (citation omitted). 
 116. Elaine Sciolino, A Prize, Laureate Says, ‘Good for Democracy,’ N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 11, 2003, at A6. 
 117. Sunder, supra note 8, at 1439-40 (quoting Farida Shaheed, Controlled or 
Autonomous: Identity and the Experience of the Network, Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws, 19 Signs 997, 1008 (1994)). 
 118. Id. at 1437. 
 119. Id. at 1438 (quoting Cassandra Balchin, assistant director of WLUML’s 
international coordination office in London). 
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and of rights that is not reflected in the dominant view of law and 
culture, but that may eventually lead to changes in that view.120  As 
such, they play a facilitative role in fostering women’s personal and 
democratic self-government.  Similarly, Nussbaum contends that, in 
India, conventional families may do less well than women’s collectives 
in fostering women’s capabilities.121  Narayan’s recounting of Third 
World feminism also highlights the critical role of association.  She 
argues that although the experience of daughters of seeing gender 
dynamics of injustice and oppression within their own family and their 
parents’ marriage was a source of a critical awareness, “it takes 
political connections to other women and their experiences” along 
with political analysis and attempts to construct solutions to “make 
women into feminists in any full-blooded sense.”122 
There are analogies to the role played by associations and social 
movements in the United States.  For example, feminist 
consciousness-raising groups served both to facilitate women’s 
capacity to fashion a sense of identity different from the one prevalent 
in the dominant culture and to prefigure forms of association 
premised on greater equality.123  Social movements may succeed in 
placing forms of inequality previously regarded as private on the 
agenda as matters of social and political justice.124 
As noted in Part I, civil society, or what Rawls calls “the 
background culture” of civil society, may generate new 
understandings of the requirements of justice, and these may bear 
both on norms governing associational life (as when a dissident group 
within a religion argues for a new interpretation), as well as on those 
governing the polity.  Notably, both Rawls and Benhabib refer to the 
realm of civil society as a place of “moral learning.”  This entails not 
only learning such civic virtues as tolerance, but also, for Benhabib, 
the learning that takes place through cultural and political conflict in a 
“civic public space of multicultural understanding and 
confrontation.”125 
What sort of model of associational life and of affirmative 
individual rights and governmental responsibilities would this 
emerging feminist model of rights within cultural and religious 
 
 120. See McClain & Fleming, supra note 25, at 318. 
 121. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 277. 
 122. Narayan, supra note 101, at 11. 
 123. I am grateful to Amy Baehr for this suggestion. 
 124. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking 
(2000) (relating the history, struggles, and successes of the battered women’s 
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themselves “the conscience of the art world” and who accused the art world of sexism 
and racism and challenged the exclusion of women artists from museums—have 
“gone almost mainstream”). 
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communities entail?  Would adopting a model of individual rights 
within culture and within community threaten the solidarity and 
strength of community life?  Would it constitute the sort of direct 
application of principles of justice to the “internal life” of associations 
that political liberalism rejects?  Could elements of political liberalism 
support this model?  For example, if members of associations are 
engaged in a struggle to determine the appropriate conception of 
justice and set of principles and values that should apply to their 
associational life, may the state properly play a role to facilitate this 
process?126  How might such a model, for example, shape laws and 
policies pertaining to regulating religious associations and other 
associations in the United States?127  What would it imply about 
efforts to promote sex equality across borders, for example, in the 
same countries in the Middle East, in which interpretations of Islam 
are asserted—and contested—as a basis for restrictions on women’s 
liberty and equality? 
Answering this difficult set of questions is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  My hypothesis, however, is that a fruitful place to begin is 
with the place of individuals within civil society, and, in particular, 
with problems of how associational life may be a place in which 
individuals negotiate equal citizenship, a place that may foster as well 
as resist such citizenship.  For example, Nussbaum argues that 
government has a responsibility to foster the capabilities and liberties 
of each person.  She makes the intriguing comment that the human 
capabilities approach “does not assume that any one affiliative 
grouping is prior or central in promoting those capabilities.”128  Thus, 
when she discusses the extent of governmental protection of freedom 
of religion, she stresses that the “protection of the central capabilities 
of citizens should always be understood to ground a compelling state 
interest,” which would justify limits to such freedom.129  It would be 
fruitful to pursue further Nussbaum’s suggestion that, in determining 
governmental regulation of and protection of associations, we should 
 
 126. For example, Ayelet Shachar proposes a model of “transformative 
accommodation,” or joint governance by the state and by religious and cultural 
minority communities, designed to empower vulnerable members of such 
communities, such as women, by putting internal pressures on those communities to 
address entrenched inequalities. Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions (2001). 
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constitutional law, see Stopler, supra note 8 (contending that current constitutional 
jurisprudence affords religions the “free exercise of discrimination” on the basis of 
sex, and that the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the Boy Scouts’ right to exclude 
homosexuals from membership, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000), portends that this freedom to discriminate will extend more broadly to all 
associations). 
 128. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 276. 
 129. Id. at 202. 
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focus on the person within the group and on how different groupings 
of persons do in protecting and promoting capabilities. 
For example, I agree with Nussbaum that such an approach could 
endorse governmental support of associations dedicated to advancing 
women’s educational attainments, economic self-sufficiency, and 
political efficacy.  However, I disagree with her that Rawls’s political 
liberalism might not support such associations because, if participation 
in them gives women a sense of empowerment that transforms their 
role within family life, government might be endorsing one form of 
family governance over the other.130  I believe that a better 
interpretation of political liberalism is that, through such support, 
government permissibly seeks to remedy the effects of the “gender 
system” (discussed in Part I) and advances the political value of the 
freedom and equality of women.  Similarly, in contrast to Nussbaum, I 
believe that these commitments within political liberalism—along with 
its commitment to reducing the involuntary gendered division of labor 
in society—would justify public education of children aimed at 
encouraging “the public perception that women are suited for many 
different roles in life, and are active members of the political and 
economic communities.”131 
Representation, as well as freedom to dissent, appear to be critical 
factors in the new model urged by Sunder and other feminists.  But 
both of these factors are consistent not only with political liberalism 
but also with Okin’s liberal feminist proposals.  In her essay, Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Okin urges that “policies designed 
to respond to the needs and claims of cultural minority groups must 
take seriously the urgency of adequately representing less powerful 
members of such groups.”132  She continues:  “Unless women—and, 
more specifically, young women (since older women often are co-
opted into reinforcing gender inequality)—are fully represented in 
negotiations about group rights, their interests may be harmed rather 
than promoted by the granting of such rights.”133  In her more recent 
revisiting of the question, she reiterates the importance of 
representation.  She further recognizes the difficult tension between 
democracy and liberal rights:  What happens if women, “when 
consulted in truly non-intimidating settings, . . . produce good reasons 
for preferring to continue aspects of their traditional subordinate 
status over moving to a status of immediate equality within their 
group?”134 
 
 130. Id. at 280-81 (discussing the example of women’s collectives in India). 
 131. Id. at 282 (arguing that her capabilities approach would support such 
education, but Rawls would likely see it as “too much promotion of a definite 
conception of the good”). 
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In The Law of Peoples, Rawls also stresses the importance of 
representation and the right of dissent.  He posits that there could be 
decent nonliberal peoples, and one example he explores is a society 
that has a “decent consultation hierarchy.”135  He stresses both the 
need for a right to dissent and the place that the representation of 
women should play in such a hierarchy in order for it to be “decent.”  
He also insists that such a society may not violate human rights.  On 
the first matter, Rawls argues: 
In political decisions a decent consultation hierarchy allows an 
opportunity for different voices to be heard—not, to be sure, in a 
way allowed by democratic institutions, but appropriately in view of 
the religious and philosophical values of the society as expressed in 
its idea of the common good.  Persons as members of associations, 
corporations, and estates have the right at some point in the 
procedure of consultation (often at the stage of selecting a group’s 
representative) to express political dissent, and the government has 
an obligation to take a group’s dissent seriously and to give a 
conscientious reply.  It is necessary and important that different 
voices be heard, because judges’ and other officials’ sincere belief in 
the justice of the legal system must include respect for the possibility 
of dissent.136 
Moreover, “should the judges and other officials listen, the 
dissenters are not required to accept the answer given to them.”137  As 
Rawls elaborates, “they may renew their protest, provided they 
explain why they are still dissatisfied, and their explanation in turn 
ought to receive a further and fuller reply.”138 
Rawls also gives special attention to the “representation in a 
consultation hierarchy of members of society, such as women, who 
may have long been subjected to oppression and abuse, amounting to 
the violation of their human rights.”139  He proposes: 
One step to ensure that their claims are appropriately taken into 
account may be to arrange that a majority of the members of the 
bodies representing the (previously) oppressed be chosen from 
among those whose rights have been violated. . . .  [O]ne condition 
of a decent hierarchical society is that its legal system and social 
order do not violate human rights.  The procedure of consultation 
must be arranged to stop all such violations.140 
 
inequality, might be appropriate in the case of patriarchal cultures or religions with a 
claim of recent oppression, but that a more liberal solution—insisting upon basic 
rights that may not be negotiated away—would be appropriate for patriarchal 
religions with no such claims. Id. at 28. 
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Finally, Rawls posits that the impact of allowing representatives to 
dissent may lead to change favorable to greater equality for women.  
Using the fictional example of “Kazanistan,” an idealized Islamic 
people with a system of law that does not institute the separation of 
church and state, he asserts: 
I further imagine, as an example of how dissent, when allowed and 
listened to, can instigate change, that in Kazanistan dissent has led 
to important reforms in the rights and role of women, with the 
judiciary agreeing that existing norms could not be squared with 
society’s common good idea of justice.141 
In this example, Rawls appears to reject the idea that religious or 
cultural comprehensive doctrines are univocal or static and 
unchanging.  An important point in this passage is that allowing 
women to express their own views of justice may lead to a revision of 
a society’s “common good idea of justice.” 
Of course, one might argue that it is wrong to leave the rights and 
role of women up for negotiation, rather than to entrench rights and 
liberties either as a matter of human rights or in a constitutional 
scheme.142  But this passage in Rawls must be read in light of his 
insistence (discussed above) both that a decent nonliberal people does 
recognize basic human rights and that religions may not justify the 
subjection of women necessary for such religion’s survival.  Thus, the 
passage may mean that, over time, evolution toward greater sex 
equality occurs because of the active role of dissent, or of what the 
feminists discussed above might call the efforts to secure rights within 
religion and community.  Moreover, a “decent nonliberal society,” by 
recognizing basic human rights and rights to representation and to 
dissent, provides conditions under which members of society may 
make such efforts at transformation without fear of punishment or 
rights violations by the legal system or the “social order.”143 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have approached the question of the import of 
Rawls’s political liberalism for the topic of equal citizenship and 
gender by examining political liberalism’s account of the place of 
associations in underwriting a stable political order and fostering 
democratic and personal self-government.  I have focused upon a set 
of feminist criticisms arising from political liberalism’s distinction 
between the political and the nonpolitical domains and its provision 
that the principles of justice should not apply directly to the internal 
life of associations.  In evaluating this criticism, I have stressed the 
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way in which political liberalism views these domains as reciprocally 
constituting and mutually supporting.  This feature of political 
liberalism leads to certain tensions, but it also rules out a sort of 
simplistic distinction between public and private life that would regard 
the realm of associational life as beyond the scope of the principles of 
justice.  To the contrary, I have argued that certain commitments 
already manifest in political liberalism may be drawn upon—and built 
upon—to develop an account of the place of associations in the 
political order that recognizes both the ways in which associational life 
may foster as well as hinder free and equal citizenship.  This 
recognition of the possible tension between associational and personal 
self-government, and the difficult questions about how government 
might address such tensions, is a fruitful avenue for further 
engagement between feminism and political liberalism.  Moreover, I 
have suggested that this same tension is a significant focus in 
important feminist work on the place of women within cultural and 
religious communities that resists dichotomies between rights and 
religion or rights and community. 
In sum, I believe that two forms of constructive engagement would 
be valuable paths for feminist analysis of the place of associations in 
securing and hindering the freedom and equality of women:  first, 
continued constructive engagement by feminists with Rawls’s work; 
and second, constructive engagement by liberal feminists, such as 
myself, with these promising forms of feminist argument that seek to 
negotiate rights within religion and culture.  These two projects are 
vital ones both with respect to the issue of gender and citizenship in 
the United States and in the global context. 
 
